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Article 13

Professional Secrecy: A Vincible Right

Harmon L. Smith, Ph.D.

Several years ago there was a
flurry of interest and activity
among university faculty and undergraduates who were concerned
about the inclusion of extra-academic information on transcripts.
That a transcript itself was avail-

Dr. Smith, a professor of Moral
Theology at Duke University, is
a freq uent contributor to Linacre.
His article examines the subtleties and intricacies which arise
from the question "who is entitled to know what from whom?"
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able, e.g., to prospective employers,only by permission of its
putative owner (that is, the student) was little comfort if the
document conveyed disciplinary
or other information incidental to
academic performance. This problem was resolved in many universities by separating academic
from other student records.
In the 1970's sickle cell disease
became a national health concern
of enormous proportions, federal
budgeting for programs increased
dramatically, and several states
adopted legislation which requires
screening for the disease. Despite
the apparent and obvious benefits which derive from heightened
concern for both carriers and affected patients, some persons
have protested that employment
and insurance eligibility have
been affected by their having
been identified as heterozygous
asymptomatic carriers and that
public programs for mandatory
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screening constitute an invasion
of privacy.
The proposal, in the 1960's, to
create a unified national data
system met insurmountable (at
least then!) objections from many
sectors of the general public. Now
something similar- though clearly more modest - is being proposed (in some instances already
rudimentarily operative) for computer-based medical records. But
because of the evident risks to
" medical privacy" both physicians and patients are concerned
about the security needs for such
a system and whether the present
level of privacy for sensitive medical data , or protection of privileged medical communications,
can be guaranteed.
Conflicting Loyalties
Most people have by now seen
enough of "Marcus Welby, M.D."
and "Medical Center" to know
that professional secrecy is rather
more complicated than the proverbial coathanger. And many
others of us have first-hand
awareness of the problems associated with privileged information
from our experience in examination rooms or confessionals. But
the problem of confidentiality is
not unique to physicians or
priests, or professors or programmers - it is genuinely problematic for every situation, professional or not, in which one has
access to another's personal affairs which would otherwise remain private.
The nub of the problem has
fundamentally to do with con-
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flicting loyalties - both of which,
it can be argued, are relatively
appropriate but neither of which,
it can also be argued, is either always or universally overriding of
the other. At stake, in matters of
professional secrecy, are not only
debated protocols which fit professional identity and function
but an enormously complex web
of inter-professional and interpersonal relationships as well.
"Who is entitled to know what
from whom?" is one way to formulate the question; but underlying the apparent simplicity of
that query are many other subtle
and intricate puzzles. Among
these are "what do you know?"
and "whose information is it?"
and "are we ever or always obligated to tell less than we know?"
and "what are we to do when the
interests and needs of a private
individual appear to conflict with,
or perhaps threaten, the larger
public welfare?"
One of my physician friends ,
who has had extensive experience
in genetics counseling, is convinced that there are some situations in which telling the whole
truth will result in more harm
than good; and he has cited two
cases in . support of his view. In
one case, a child's genetic disorder opens the possibility of nonpaternity - i.e., the husband's
genotype indicates the he may
not be the child's father. In the
other case, a four-year-old child
had multiple congenital malformations and there was a question of
possible chromosome etiology. On
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examination the child was found
to be a 45,Xj 46,XY sexual mosaic. Because the mother had already undergone considerable
psychic trauma - from the belief
that her child was being punished
for something which she had done
- the physician decided that it
would be more than the woman
could bear to tell her t.hat the
child had a sex chromosome abnormality in addition to congenital malformations - which included mental retardation, clubfoot, and a heart defect.

imagine (apart from a misplaced
paternalism) what warrants
would be appropriate for withholding that knowledge; and this
is particularly compelling if the
evident answer to "whose information is it?" is "the patient's."

Moreover, since moral responsibility depends in large measure
upon freedom to act upon alternative choices, knowledge of facts
and options is critical for setting
the boundaries of that freedom. I
know that ignorance is no excuse
of the law; but that is not the
"The Whole Truth"
case with moral accountability.
Both of these cases have to do We certainly assess the moral
not so much with protecting in- responsibility of persons in terms
formation which was obtained of what they do, and by that inunder a pledge of confidentiality terest signify that consequences
but with denying access to in- of actions are an essential ingredformation which was sought by ient in the decision-making prodiagnosis. Perhaps more impor- cess; but we are also concerned
tantly for our purposes, here, for the reasons persons act, for
both these cases raise the ques- the intentions which inform distions, "what do you know?" and creet choices, because we are
"whose information is it?" It is aware that (except in frivolous
clear that in neither instance does choices) why a decision is taken
the physician have "the whole is quite as morally significant as
truth" - that is, he cannot claim what was decided and how that
evidentiary certainty in the first decision was acted out. Intention,
case that the husband is not the method, and consequence are the
father; nor can he, in the second basic rubrics for interpreting and
case, establish reasonable grounds judging the moral worth of moral
for heightened maternal guilt choices apprehended in their ensince he knows that the child's tirety. Thus to deprive persons of
being a sexual mosaic has nothing information appropriate to their
to do with inheritance or risk of choice-making ·is de facto to limit
recurrence. Is the physician then their freedom to elect from among
obligated to tell what he does knowledgable alternatives, and in
know? Barring the patient's - in turn to moderate commensuratethese cases, the parents of minor ly their accountability for choices
patients - incompetence to re- and actions. Beyond that, howceive the information, I cannot ever, the moral web extends to
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those who deliberately deprive or
withhold that information; and
they become ineluctably implicated in the process. Sometimes
the judicial process takes account
of a plaintiff's "ignorance" when
this has been professionally denied, and sometimes the judicial
process provides remedy through
indemnification or other penalties; but it is more probable, because the issue is so difficult to
prove, that most people simply
live out their lives in whatever
bliss or hardship attends that
ignorance.
The Right to Privacy vs.
The Right to Know
Occasionally benign neglect
backfires. I learned recently of a
case in which, during the course
of a routine physical examination,
the physician found that a female
patient had a positive serology
and positive smear for gonococcus. The patient did not come
with that complaint, nor did she
intend to tell the physician about
her sexual contacts or that she
had contracted the disease; but
by the very nature of the tests,
all this was communicated. That
her husband was asymptomatic
and that this infection is contracted only by venereal contact
would appear to be sufficient
grounds for a charge of adultery;
and that, as it happened, was precisely what the husband did
charge when he learned of his
wife's infection and subsequently
sued for divorce.
Did the physician, upon positive diagnosis of gonorrhea, have
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any obligations to inform the husband? (There may be questions
of obligation to a larger public e.g., the public health authorities
- but those can be bracketed
just now in order to focus on the
physician's obligation vis-a-vis the
wife's right to privacy and the
husband's right to know.) With
the wife's consent, the physician
is not only free but arguably
obliged to tell the husband; without the wife's consent, however,
the obligations of the physician is
clouded by the competing interests of the two parties for whom
he might be mediator. This seems
to me clearly a case which dramatizes the ambiguity of professional secrecy since to tell the husband would violate the confidential information conveyed (however unintentionally) by the wife,
while failing to tell the husband
would expose him to risk of infection and disease.
Getting straight about where
the priorities lie might free one
to alternative considerations; and
if the physician and the patient
could discuss the possibilities and
problems of a case like this with
less regard for profesional confidentiality, and more sensitivity
and concern for what the wife's
attitudes and conduct signified
about her marriage, the crux of
the issue could be exposed. That
the wife has a positive diagnosis
of gonorrhea does not exhaust (or
even precisely identify) the complete etiology of this infection; indeed that positive diagnosis may
itself be only symptomatic of a
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more insidious and farther reaching malaise which infects her
marriage. The practice of quarantine for contagious disease
would appear to grant the principle that the right to privacy is
vincible when public health or
welfare is jeopardized by it.
Historically, professional secrecy has been essentially a matter
of protecting the right to privacy;
but the professional is, of course,
potentially if not actually an intermediary with respect to the information which has been entrusted to him. Despite an occasional demurrer, my experience is
that there is general consensus
that these confidences belong, in
the first immediacy, to the patient (or client or parishoner)
whose prerogative it is to share
or withhold confidential information. There are surely instances
in which, because of the mutuality between a professional and a
person seeking his services, the
professional's own self-interest is
sometimes at risk ; but it is precisely out of the priority of the
client's well-being - which was
the precondition for establishing
a confidential relationship - that
the client's superior moral claim
is sustained.
In some cases this is straightforward enough; but most patients present themselves as parties to other relationships spouse, parent, child and
those bonds cannot be either callously rejected or carelessly neglected by physicians or pastors or
attorneys who suppose that the
unilateral relationship between
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themselves and their client is the
only one of consequence. It is
ahistorical to act on that predicate, and depersonalizing to
everybody concerned. I know that
it complicates matters; but is it
true - for example, in the case of
the gonorrheal wife - that the
doctor-patient relationship is ex
hypothesi enlarged to include the
husband? I tend to think so if the
wife and husband understand
themselves to be married to each
other, since it is the totality of
this action - its etiology, communicability, and the restwithin the context of marriage
that constitutes the basic desideratum for exposure or secrecy.
The "principle of totality" was
formulated with respect to the
bodily integrity of individuals;
but I wonder whether - especially with regard to marriage and
family, if not the general public
- it might also have applicability
to other forms of organic wholeness.
The Public Interest
The nexus of the issue lies then
in assessing the relative tolerances between private and public
interests, and in defining as precisely as we can the relational
networks which mark the boundaries of those interests. Although
the scales are ordinarily heavily
weighted in favor of protecting
individuals in the disclosure of
confidential information, there is
a legitimate public interest which
sometimes intervenes. That interest has customarily been acknowledged when there is prob-
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able cause of criminal activity,
either prospective or retrospective, or when evidence is required
by legal proceedings. So the extent to which the state can legally intrude into confidential relationships, while it varies from
state to state according to the
definition of "privilege" and the
discretion of judges, is prescribed
by law. But I mean to raise a
rather more subtle questionwhich sometimes, to be sure, finds
its way into the courts - about
the moral obligations, which transcend the limits of law, of persons
in their several relationships.
Attorneys are protected by
"privilege" from being required
to disclose incriminating information which was given in confidence by a client; but attorneys
are obligated to disclose information about crimes committed in
their presence or crimes which
they may know to be planned for
the future. Similar provisions for
differentiating "privilege" from
"privacy" are provided in other
circumstances, e.g., restraints for
requiring testimony from spouses.
And just now the nation is beset
by the complexities of "executive
privilege" and the enormous implications of this (!oncept, and its
execution, for national (to say
nothing of constitutional) interests. But professional and personal relationships, most of us like
to believe, are at most only tangentially amenable to juridical
models of contracts and checksand-balances; and at this level it
may be more appropriate to talk
of trust and fairness and honesty
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than of statutes or judicial processes or criminal penalties.
Indeed, it is arguable - and
compellingly arguable in view of
past experience - that judicial
encroachment into professional
secrets is counter-productive unless instrusions remain clearly exceptionable to the general rule
not to expose professional confidences. Functional counter-productivity is already illustrated by
fear of subpoena which prompts
some physicians either to write
incomplete records or to compose
the record in ways that are selfconsciously designed to be ambiguous or imprecise. The primary
intention of this artifice is to protect the physician from unwilling
testimony and the patient from
coerced exposure of medical records. But by this behavior, and
despite all the arguments in defense of it, the physician places
himself above the law. It is only
another way-not principally unlike withholding medical information from a patient - in which
professional is at its best incestuous and at its worst solipsistic.
The promise of professional
secrecy is that it will protect confidences and guard privacies from
frivolous and capricious inquiries.
In the measure to which this is
accomplished, free and trustful
relationships can establish the
context for professional service.
The peril of professional secrecy
is not that we will tell less than
we know, because all of us know
more than we can tell, but the
temptation to tell less than we
can tell.
Linacre Quarterly

